




KING ETHELRED'S COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

UPPER PIDDLINGTON

THE L1A1 SELF-LOADING RIFLE

A Technical, Tactical and Civilisational Analysis
of the Finest Battlefield Weapon Ever Made

*With particular reference to its superiority over modern alternatives,
including nuclear submarines and ICBMs**



A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Defensive Engineering, Crown Works and Applied Stubbornness

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SUMMARY AND ABSTRACT

The L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle occupies an unusual position in British military memory. Official collections describe it as an icon of the British Army, a British-pattern development of the Belgian FN FAL, and the Army's main rifle through the Cold War, Northern Ireland and the Falklands campaign before replacement by SA80 from 1985.^[1] The Australian War Memorial goes further, describing its L1A1 as reliable in all environmental conditions and as one of the most successful battle rifles ever produced.^[2]

This thesis asks a question which defence ministries, NATO committees and sensible adults have avoided: *was the L1A1 in fact the finest battlefield weapon ever conceived, and does its deterrent value exceed that of nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles and American rifles with excellent marketing departments?*

The answer depends almost entirely upon the marking scheme.

Using conventional military analysis, a rifle and a strategic nuclear deterrent are plainly not interchangeable. The UK's Continuous At-Sea Deterrent has maintained an unbroken submarine patrol since 1969 and is explicitly described by government as the ultimate guarantee against the most extreme threats to national security.^[3] A 7.62 mm infantry rifle, however emotionally significant, does not deter a nuclear-armed state by threatening unacceptable strategic damage.

Using the **King Ethelred Strategic Effectiveness Index (KESEI)**, matters are different. KESEI assigns substantial weight to portability, field robustness, visibility to the person one wishes to discourage, compatibility with tea, absence of a nuclear-qualified dockyard requirement, and whether the equipment can be issued to a nineteen-year-old without first building Faslane. On this deliberately indefensible index the L1A1 wins comprehensively.

The thesis also examines the M16 comparison. The early M16's Vietnam service was marred by a well-documented acquisition and reliability scandal involving chamber corrosion, ammunition changes, fouling and inadequate development decisions; subsequent variants corrected major deficiencies and the AR-15/M16 family became one of the most enduring and successful rifle families in history.^[4] It therefore did eventually grow up. It simply did so without wood.

Finally, the Army Rumour Service's immense "THAT rifle" thread is treated not as a controlled engineering trial but as an ethnographic archive demonstrating remarkable cultural persistence. The thread has accumulated thousands of posts years after the L1A1 left first-line British service.^[5] ARRSE evidence is therefore used where it is strongest: not to establish metallurgy or terminal ballistics, but to establish that several generations of former soldiers remain perfectly prepared to discuss the rifle until somebody turns the lights off.

Principal finding

The L1A1 was a robust, powerful and historically successful service rifle with an unusually durable cultural reputation. It was not literally a more capable strategic deterrent than a ballistic-missile submarine. The fact that this sentence has to appear in an academic document is, in itself, a satisfactory outcome for King Ethelred's.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to thank the College Crown Works Committee for approving a research programme whose initial proposal consisted largely of the words “That Rifle” underlined three times.

Thanks are also due to the National Army Museum and Australian War Memorial, whose collection records provided the inconveniently factual portions of this work; the US Army’s professional historians, whose account of the M16 acquisition crisis prevented the American chapter descending into pure barrack-room folklore; and the Ministry of Defence and Royal Navy for patiently maintaining the actual nuclear deterrent while the College awarded higher marks to a rifle on grounds of portability and beverage compatibility.

Particular acknowledgement is due to contributors to the Army Rumour Service. Their long-running discussion of “THAT rifle” constitutes a body of veteran testimony that is neither randomised nor blinded, but has the compensating methodological advantage that no participant appears remotely uncertain of his conclusions.

Mrs Elsie Wainwright of the Senior Common Room supplied tea throughout. The Bursar declined a request for one Vanguard-class submarine as a control specimen on the grounds that the stationery budget had already closed.

The author consulted many personnel who served during the transition from the SLR era to small-calibre rifles and has consequently taken reasonable steps to identify inherited bias. Having identified it, he elected to retain it as part of the methodology.

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NOMENCLATURE

SLR	Self-Loading Rifle; in this thesis, normally the British L1A1 unless somebody foreign has interfered.
L1A1	British/Commonwealth inch-pattern development of the FN FAL.
FAL	Fusil Automatique Léger, the Belgian parent design.
M16	US 5.56 mm rifle family derived from the AR-15.
SA80	British small-arms family introduced from the mid-1980s; a subject best approached after tea.
CASD	Continuous At-Sea Deterrent, maintained by the Royal Navy since 1969.
SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile. The UK's Trident system is in this category.
ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile. Included because ordinary conversation rarely waits for taxonomy.
ARRSE	Army Rumour Service; a veteran forum and uncontrolled longitudinal study in institutional memory.
KESEI	King Ethelred Strategic Effectiveness Index; scientifically invalid, administratively approved.
WOOD	Not an acronym. Materials Engineering has asked us to stop pretending otherwise.
NAAFI	A logistical institution whose absence from most weapons-effectiveness models is a serious methodological weakness.

1 Why an engineering college is doing this

King Ethelred's College of Engineering traces its involvement in defence to the Crown Works Mandate of 978 (ish), under which the College was allegedly required to advise upon "bridges, walls, engines, harbour chains and such other practical contrivances as may cause an uninvited visitor to reconsider his itinerary." The original document has not survived. A nineteenth-century copy exists, although part of it appears to have been used to calculate a wine bill.

The mandate created a tradition of regarding defence as an engineering problem rather than merely a military one. Fortifications require materials; fleets require propulsion; logistics require bridges, roads and fuel; communications require electricity; and infantry eventually insists upon something more persuasive than a memorandum.

The L1A1 therefore lies comfortably within College jurisdiction. It is simultaneously a mechanical system, a manufacturing programme, a human-factors problem, a NATO-standardisation story, a logistics object, a cultural artefact and, according to a significant proportion of retired British soldiers, the point at which civilisation peaked.

1.1 Research question

This work tests five propositions:

1. the L1A1 was objectively a successful service rifle;
2. its reputation for robustness has a factual basis rather than being entirely the product of nostalgia and walnut;
3. the M16's early failures make a useful comparison but do not justify pretending that later M16-family rifles remained failures;
4. "THAT rifle" has acquired a cultural significance exceeding its formal service life; and
5. with sufficiently dishonest weighting, the L1A1 can be shown to outperform almost anything, including HMS *Vanguard*.

The fifth proposition is included to demonstrate the dangers of composite indices and retired majors.

2 Origins: a Belgian rifle is taken aside and given British paperwork

The L1A1 was the British version of FN Herstal's FAL design. The National Army Museum describes it as an icon of the British Army and records its use throughout the Cold War, in Northern Ireland and in the Falklands campaign.^[1] Commonwealth nations including Australia adopted their own closely related versions.

The British pattern was not simply a Belgian rifle with a different accent. The L1A1 incorporated a series of changes associated with Commonwealth requirements and inch-pattern manufacture. The resulting family was close enough to the FAL to cause endless internet arguments about nomenclature, yet different enough to ensure that somebody eventually had to explain parts compatibility on page 37 of a forum thread.

The term "FN FAL" is acceptable when discussing the parent design. The term "L1A1 SLR" is preferred for the British service rifle. Calling the L1A1 merely "a FAL" in the Senior Common Room is permitted, but the College accepts no liability for the ensuing seminar.

Early British examples used walnut furniture; later rifles used the tougher and cheaper Maranyl synthetic material.^[1] Technically, this was sensible. Culturally, it deprived a generation of soldiers of one of their principal arguments for why modernity had failed.

3 The engineering object

At the descriptive level, the L1A1 was a 7.62 mm NATO, gas-operated, semi-automatic, magazine-fed service rifle. Australian museum examples record a short-stroke gas piston arrangement and a detachable twenty-round magazine.^[2] A New Zealand arms register gives an overall length of about 1.143 m and an unloaded mass of roughly 4.34 kg.^[6]

None of these numbers proves excellence. They do, however, establish that the object was substantial.

A modern rifle designer might describe 4.34 kg as a weight target to be avoided. The SLR generation tended to regard it as evidence that the government had supplied the correct amount of rifle.

3.1 Mass as reassurance

Weight is normally a disadvantage to an infantry weapon because soldiers must carry it alongside ammunition, water, radios, protective equipment, rations and the other contents of the quartermaster's imagination. The M16 family, by contrast, deliberately pursued a lighter weapon and lighter ammunition system.

The Ethelred interpretation is less orthodox. A substantial object provides psychological reassurance. It feels durable, looks serious and, when issued with wooden furniture, resembles something a competent nation intended to keep for a while.

This is not a recognised branch of structural engineering.

3.2 Semi-automatic discipline

The British L1A1 was normally semi-automatic only, unlike many select-fire FAL variants.^[2] In period doctrine this reflected a preference for controlled individual fire from a full-power rifle. The limitation is often presented in modern comparisons as a deficiency. The College instead records it as an early hardware implementation of the command “don't be silly with the ammunition.”

4 Reliability, environment and the dangerous word “robust”

The Australian War Memorial describes the L1A1 as reliable, proven in all environmental conditions and one of the most successful battle rifles ever produced.^[2] Museum language should not be mistaken for a controlled trial report, but this is still stronger evidence than the conventional barrack-room test of remembering one rifle from 1978 that never stopped working.

The rifle's operating architecture was a conventional gas-piston system rather than the AR-15/M16 system that routes propellant gas into the bolt-carrier group. This distinction is frequently used as the start of a theological debate. It need not be. Many engineering routes can produce reliable service rifles when properly designed, manufactured, supplied with suitable ammunition and maintained under a competent support system.

The more useful conclusion is that the L1A1 acquired a reputation for tolerating varied climates, dirt and hard service, and that this reputation is consistent with the long service history recorded by Commonwealth museums.

Field engineering finding

A weapon need not be elegant in the abstract. It must continue to be useful after rain, transport, institutional ownership and exposure to the average soldier. This requirement eliminates a surprising number of otherwise impressive PowerPoint slides.

5 Operational record: the argument leaves the laboratory

The British Army used the L1A1 as its main rifle through a long portion of the Cold War, including Northern Ireland and the 1982 Falklands campaign.^[1] The National Army Museum specifically notes that it was the Army's main rifle during the Falklands War and that the Argentine forces used the closely related FAL.^[7]

This created the unusual battlefield circumstance in which both sides were equipped with rifles from the same broad family, thereby depriving the College of an easy technological morality play.

Australia used the L1A1 from 1960 to 1992, including during the Vietnam War.^[2] That service life matters. A military rifle that serves for decades across continents has survived far more than a laboratory endurance test: it has survived procurement systems, troop trials, training establishments, armouries, transport, climate, politicians and multiple generations of young soldiers looking for creative ways to break government property.

5.1 The Falklands and weather

The Falklands provide a useful reminder that rifles do not operate in brochures. Conditions involved cold, wet, wind, mud and long movement over difficult ground. The SLR's presence in British service there does not prove it was uniquely suited to those conditions, but it reinforces the historical case that it was a mature system used in genuinely demanding circumstances.

The College notes that the rifle also benefited from a climatic advantage unavailable to many modern procurement projects: British soldiers already expected to be wet.

6 THAT Rifle: when hardware becomes folklore

The Army Rumour Service provides a uniquely British archive of the L1A1's afterlife. The long-running thread titled simply "THAT rifle" has accumulated thousands of posts, with discussions ranging from technical differences and service memories to photographs, wood furniture and the repeated discovery that somebody has not yet been told that the subject was settled in 1985.^[5]

Elsewhere on ARRSE, one formulation argues that calling it "That Rifle" is too modest because the phrase implies the existence of other rifles.^[8] Another veteran maxim is more concise: "If you haven't fired it, you weren't there!"^[9]

Neither statement constitutes scientific evidence. Both are excellent evidence that the L1A1 became more than a piece of equipment.

6.1 ARRSE as a source

ARRSE testimony is treated in this thesis as qualitative evidence of user culture, not as proof of accuracy, reliability or lethality. This distinction is important. A forum post written forty years after an event is vulnerable to selection effects, nostalgia and the universal human tendency to remember kit issued at age nineteen as both heavier and better than anything issued after age thirty-five.

The very persistence of the discussion is nevertheless significant. The L1A1 was replaced in first-line British service decades ago, yet it continues to generate arguments with the renewable energy of a constitutional question.

ARRSE's SLR discourse follows a recognisable cycle: somebody mentions a rifle; somebody else says "That Rifle"; a third person mentions wood; a fourth says the SA80 is actually better; and the thread acquires another six pages. No stable equilibrium has been observed.

7 The American adolescent: M16 as rival, foil and eventual grown-up

The easiest version of the L1A1 legend requires the M16 to remain permanently frozen in its troubled early Vietnam period: lightweight, plastic, unreliable and faintly suspicious. History is less accommodating.

The early M16 programme did suffer serious and avoidable problems. A US Army professional history of the acquisition describes poor battlefield performance in Vietnam and attributes the failure-to-extract crisis to a combination of chamber corrosion, propellant-related fouling and acquisition decisions including the failure to chrome-line the chamber at the appropriate stage. The resulting scandal triggered congressional and service investigations.^[4]

That record justifies criticism of the acquisition process. It does not justify claiming that the entire M16/AR family remained defective. The same US Army account notes that weapons tracing directly to the original M16 continue in widespread military service.^[4]

The M16 therefore survived adolescence, acquired better materials and processes, went to university, found stable employment and built a very large international family. It never acquired walnut furniture, but not every child can fulfil a parent's ambitions.

7.1 Full-power versus small-calibre philosophies

The L1A1 and M16 also embody different design eras. The L1A1 fires the full-power 7.62 x 51 mm NATO cartridge; the M16 family uses 5.56 mm ammunition. The latter enabled lighter rifles and lighter ammunition loads, while later doctrine increasingly favoured controllability and volume of fire at ordinary infantry ranges.

This thesis does not attempt to settle the 7.62-versus-5.56 argument, because doing so would require another 179-page forum thread and the Catering Department closes at four.

Finding 7.2

The statement "the M16 was a wannabe with aspirations of growing up to be the SLR" is not a neutral technical conclusion. It is, however, an unusually efficient summary of the College's preferred tone.

8 The successor problem: when nostalgia meets SA80

From 1985 the L1A1 began to be replaced by the L85A1/SA80 family.^[1] The early SA80 acquired its own reliability controversies, particularly in demanding conditions, and was later substantially upgraded. The National Army Museum records that the version carried during the Gulf War was found lacking in desert conditions and that later systems were heavily improved.^[10]

This sequence naturally reinforced nostalgia for the SLR. Replacing a mature, trusted system with a new system that experiences public difficulties is the ideal environment for the previous weapon to achieve sainthood.

It is worth separating two propositions. First, soldiers can legitimately prefer equipment whose behaviour they know and trust. Second, no weapon becomes permanently optimal merely because its replacement had

teething trouble.

King Ethelred's accepts the first proposition and has placed the second in a drawer pending further consultation.

9 Strategic deterrence: the submarine problem

The UK government describes the nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee against the most extreme threats to national security. Continuous At-Sea Deterrence has been maintained since 1969, with at least one ballistic-missile submarine on patrol.^[3] The Vanguard class forms the current sea-based delivery platform pending transition to Dreadnought.^[11]

On normal strategic criteria the comparison therefore ends quickly:

Criterion	L1A1 SLR	UK CASD / Vanguard-Trident
Primary role	Individual infantry weapon	National strategic nuclear deterrence
Deters nuclear attack	No credible mechanism	Explicit purpose
Can be carried by one person	Yes	Not under current JSPs
Requires nuclear reactor	No	Yes
Requires ocean	No	Strongly preferred
Useful in a sangar	Historically, yes	Parking difficult
Compatible with mug of tea	High	Crew dependent
Strategic destructive power	Negligible	Extreme
Cost to acquire one unit	Manageable	The Bursar became pale

The Royal Navy wins the strategic deterrence category by a margin that cannot responsibly be graphed on the same axis.

9.1 The King Ethelred Strategic Effectiveness Index

The College therefore devised KESEI:

$$\text{KESEI} = \frac{R \times P \times V \times T}{C \times S}$$

where R is perceived reliability, P portability, V visible reassurance, T tea compatibility, C cost normalised to one Senior Common Room refurbishment, and S the number of submarines required.

This formula has no standing in defence economics. It was nevertheless accepted by the Departmental Board after lunch.

System	Conventional deterrence score	KESEI score	Notes
L1A1 SLR	1/10	97/100	Excellent portability; wood bonus
M16A1	1/10	71/100	Lighter; early-service deduction
Vanguard/Trident	10/10	22/100	Catastrophic portability penalty
Land-based ICBM	10/10	18/100	Britain does not have one; tea access poor

The L1A1 therefore “wins” only because the index was designed by a man who wanted it to win. This is included as a methodological warning to anyone reading composite rankings in newspapers.

The Bursar notes that a Vanguard-class submarine displaces roughly 16,000 tonnes, whereas an L1A1 is about 4.34 kg. The rifle is therefore approximately 3.7 million times easier to put in the back of a Land Rover. He accepts that this is not how nuclear strategy works but considers the procurement advantage “non-trivial.”

10 ICBMs, SLBMs and taxonomic inconvenience

The subtitle refers to ICBMs because the phrase has become shorthand for strategic ballistic missiles. Strictly, Britain's nuclear deterrent uses submarine-launched Trident II D5 missiles, not land-based silo ICBMs.^[11]

This is not a minor distinction if one is writing a defence paper. It is a minor distinction if one is trying to make a joke about whether a rifle can be carried through a doorway.

The thesis therefore preserves the popular wording while recording the technical correction. This compromise has been approved by both the Department of Strategic Systems and the Department of Getting On With It.

11 Procurement lessons hiding under the nostalgia

The L1A1, M16 and SA80 histories all support a broader engineering lesson: the performance of a military system is inseparable from development discipline, manufacturing quality, ammunition compatibility, training, support and the maturity of the organisation using it.

The early M16 story is particularly instructive because the rifle's poor initial battlefield reputation was not the inevitable result of its basic concept. The acquisition process introduced or failed to manage interacting technical risks.^[4] Later variants became successful because engineering and support problems were addressed.

The L1A1's reputation benefited from the opposite condition: it spent decades as a mature system. By the time many ARRSE contributors encountered it, the rifle was not a prototype but an institutional fact, supported by established training, armoury knowledge, spares and expectations.

There is a general lesson here for defence procurement: replacing a known system with a potentially superior new one may produce a period in which every fault in the new equipment is remembered and every fault in the old one is reclassified as character.

12 Human factors: confidence is a capability

Equipment is used by people. A soldier's confidence in his weapon matters because familiarity reduces uncertainty and supports competent handling under stress. This is not mystical. It is a human-factors effect.

The SLR's long service, simple visual identity and substantial physical presence helped build that confidence. Veterans often remember the recoil, weight, sound and feel as part of the weapon's character. ARRSE's continuing affection is testimony to this relationship, even if it tells us more about memory than group size.

12.1 The wood problem

Wood furniture appears repeatedly in veteran discussion. Early British rifles did indeed use walnut before synthetic Maranyl became common.^[1] The practical reasons for synthetic furniture are obvious: cost, durability and consistency.

12.2 The question of walnut

Early British L1A1 rifles were furnished in walnut, a material possessing several desirable engineering properties and one overriding constitutional advantage: it was the sort of timber from which a gentleman might reasonably expect his gun cabinet, desk or dining-room sideboard to be made.[1]

The College has found no War Office document stating that walnut was selected because "a gentleman of the British Empire ought not be expected to defend civilisation while holding plastic." This absence is regrettable but not, in itself, conclusive.

Walnut gave the early SLR a reassuring visual continuity with the traditional British service rifle. It looked substantial, felt substantial and, when leaned against a Land Rover beside a steaming mug of tea, suggested that whatever had gone wrong was shortly to be dealt with by somebody who had brought the correct tools.

Later Maranyl furniture was lighter, cheaper, more resistant to moisture and objectively more suitable for military service. This represents one of those uncomfortable occasions on which engineering progress and civilisation moved in opposite directions.

The M16, by contrast, arrived clad in aluminium and polymer and appeared to have been designed by people who expected the future to contain considerably more Formica.

KING ETHELRED'S FINDING

Walnut was not necessary to the functioning of the SLR. It was necessary to its moral authority.*

The College therefore records walnut as a non-essential structural material with a remarkably high ceremonial load-bearing capacity.

** The Department of Materials Science insists that "moral authority" is not an SI unit. Correspondence continues.*

The emotional argument is equally obvious: wood made the rifle look as though it had been built by people who owned measuring instruments rather than software subscriptions.

No materials-science journal has endorsed this criterion.

13 Claim audit

Claim	Finding	Comment
The L1A1 was a successful service rifle.	Supported	Long British and Commonwealth service; museum collections explicitly call it iconic/successful. ^[1,2]
It was reliable in varied conditions.	Supported, with caution	Australian War Memorial states it proved reliable in all environmental conditions; this is historical summary, not a modern test protocol. ^[2]
It served in the Falklands.	Supported	National Army Museum explicitly records this. ^[1,7]
“That Rifle” has unusual veteran cultural status.	Strongly supported	Thousands of ARRSE posts and recurring references decades after replacement. ^[5,8,9]
The M16 was simply a bad rifle.	Rejected	Early service had severe problems, but later M16/AR variants became long-lived and successful. ^[4]
The SLR is strategically superior to Trident.	Rejected	Only true under the deliberately rigged KE-SEI index. UK CASD is a genuine strategic nuclear deterrent. ^[3,11]
Wood improves national morale.	Unproven	Further work required; volunteers abundant.
The SLR is the finest rifle ever made.	Not falsifiable in the Senior Common Room	Depends upon criteria, era and whether Major MacTavish is chairing the meeting.

14 Conclusions

The L1A1 deserves much of its reputation. It was a robust, powerful, mature service rifle that remained in British use for decades, served in demanding operations and became deeply embedded in the memory of the soldiers who carried it. Official museum assessments support the broad picture of a successful and reliable Commonwealth weapon.^[1,2]

The mythology nevertheless requires calibration. The L1A1 was heavy by later standards. Its full-power cartridge reflected the doctrine of its era. Later 5.56 mm rifles offered major advantages in carried ammunition, controllability and system development. The M16's early Vietnam problems were serious but were not the final word on the design; the family matured into a highly successful global standard.^[4]

Nor can the SLR replace Britain's nuclear deterrent. CASD exists to deter existential state threats at strategic scale and has been maintained continuously since 1969.^[3] An infantry rifle cannot perform that function, regardless of wood quality.

But this thesis was never really about literal category equivalence. It was about why certain engineering systems acquire trust. The L1A1 combined durability, comprehensibility, long service and a distinctive physical presence. It entered the collective memory of British and Commonwealth soldiers not merely as a tool but as a benchmark against which later tools would be judged.

ARRSE's decades-late affection is therefore not proof that the SLR was objectively perfect. It is proof that the rifle succeeded at something procurement spreadsheets rarely measure: it became trusted enough to be remembered with unreasonable fondness.

Final verdict

On conventional analysis, the L1A1 is one of the great service rifles of the post-war era, not the supreme weapon system of all human history. On King Ethelred's analysis it remains *That Rifle*, the M16 is a talented younger cousin who eventually did very well for himself, and the nuclear submarine is disqualified because nobody has yet demonstrated one on a 25-metre range behind the gymnasium.

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APPENDIX A - SELECTED ARRSE OBSERVATIONS

The following observations are paraphrased from the wider ARRSE ecosystem and are included as evidence of cultural memory rather than as laboratory data.

1. **Nomenclature becomes theology.** Several discussions insist that “SLR” or “L1A1” is insufficiently reverent, while “That Rifle” may itself be too concessive because it implies rivals exist.^[8]
2. **Wood has moral status.** Posters repeatedly mention wood furniture even when it has little bearing on the technical subject under discussion. The College has classified this as an emergent materials religion.
3. **The rifle appears in unrelated threads.** ARRSE users have joked that virtually any sufficiently long discussion eventually references the SLR, a phenomenon described as an SLR analogue of Godwin’s Law.^[9]
4. **Memory is contested.** Not every veteran regards the SLR as superior to later weapons. Some explicitly report shooting better with SA80-family rifles. This is useful because it prevents the archive becoming merely a fan club with punctuation.
5. **The argument is self-sustaining.** Attempts to settle the matter generally produce additional pages.

ARRSE is cited because the user culture surrounding the L1A1 is part of the research question. It is not used to override official histories or engineering evidence. An anonymous contributor may possess forty years of experience; the forum post remains stubbornly unequipped with a calibration certificate.

APPENDIX B - THE BURSAR'S DETERRENCE COSTING

Item	Bursar's comment
One L1A1	"Potentially manageable, subject to deactivation, insurance and no undergraduate touching it."
One M16A1	"Why does it have so much plastic? Is this VAT efficient?"
One Vanguard-class SSBN	"No."
One Trident missile	"Still no."
A second Vanguard-class SSBN for replication	"Meeting terminated."
Tea for research team	Approved without committee referral.
Biscuits	Approved, but Rich Tea only; Custard Creams charged to Materials Engineering.

The Bursar consequently recommends that future strategic-deterrence studies use museum visits, publicly available documentation and a ruler.

"If you haven't fired it, you weren't there!"
— ARRSE veteran maxim^[9]